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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
In this digital age with myriad forms of communication, faxes 
no longer dominate, as they once did.  Yet, faxes are the focus 
of our attention today.  Although complicated by a phalanx of 
parties, the essence of this dispute is whether a pharmaceutical 
company violated a federal statute by impermissibly sending 
two faxes to a doctor.   
The plaintiff-appellant in this case is Physicians Healthsource, 
Inc. (“PHI”), the prior employer of the doctor, who was the 
recipient of the faxes.  The appellees in this case are Cephalon, 
Inc., Cephalon Clinical Partners, L.P., and Cephalon 
Development Corporation (collectively “Cephalon”), and 
SciMedica Group, LLC and SciMedica Group Marketing 
Research and Consulting, LLC (“SciMedica” collectively with 
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Cephalon “Defendants”).1  Cephalon drug representatives met 
with the PHI doctor on multiple occasions to discuss various 
pharmaceutical drugs.  The two faxes in dispute were sent to 
the PHI doctor on behalf of Cephalon.   
PHI believes these faxes were unsolicited and thus sent in 
violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
(“TCPA”), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394, as amended 
by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (“JFPA”), Pub. L. No. 
109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227, 
collectively referred to herein as the “TCPA”).  Additionally, 
PHI argues that if the faxes are found to be solicited, they 
nevertheless violated the TCPA by failing to include opt-out 
language.   
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants, finding that there was no genuine dispute of 
material fact that the faxes were solicited and that the TCPA 
does not require solicited faxes to contain opt-out notices.  For 
the reasons detailed below, we will affirm.  
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
In 2009, two faxes were sent to Dr. Jose Martinez on behalf of 
Cephalon.2  At the time, Dr. Martinez worked for PHI, 
 
1 Blitz Research, Inc. (“Blitz”) is a third-party defendant, and 
SciMedica Group, LLC and SciMedica Group Marketing 
Research and Consulting, LLC are third-party plaintiffs.  
2 At summary judgment, Cephalon argued that the faxes were 
sent by SciMedica, while SciMedica contended the two faxes 
were transmitted by Blitz, and so SciMedica filed a crossclaim 
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practiced in the area of pain management, and met with 
Cephalon drug representatives on various occasions to discuss 
different Cephalon drugs.  During certain visits, Cephalon 
representatives asked Dr. Martinez if they could follow up with 
him and “send [him] things,” after which faxes were 
sometimes then sent, faxes that Dr. Martinez never told 
Cephalon or its representatives to stop sending.  JA195.  Here 
though, only two faxes are in dispute.   
The first fax at issue, addressed to Dr. Martinez, was an 
invitation to a dinner meeting program on a drug called 
AMRIX®.  The second fax was an invitation to a promotional 
product lunch on FENTORA®.  Both drugs are pain 
medications, and both are drugs that Dr. Martinez had 
discussed with Cephalon representatives previously.  Indeed, 
at his request, Dr. Martinez had received samples of AMRIX® 
on multiple occasions.  Neither fax included opt-out language 
(i.e., language informing the recipient that he or she could 
decline future faxes).   
Importantly, it is undisputed that PHI provided its fax number 
to Defendants via business cards.  PHI concedes that “at best, 
Defendants marshalled enough evidence at summary judgment 
to show . . . [PHI’s] voluntary communication” of its fax 
number to Defendants.  Appellant’s Br. 24 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added).  And during his deposition, 
Dr. Martinez noted that the business cards, with the fax number 
 
against Blitz.  It is undisputed that Cephalon had another party 
send the faxes on its behalf, and for the purpose of resolving 
this appeal whether SciMedica sent the faxes or Blitz sent the 
faxes is immaterial.   
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in question, were made available to drug representatives, so 
that they could get in touch with him.   
Nevertheless, believing these faxes were sent in violation of 
the TCPA, PHI subsequently filed a putative class action 
complaint asserting damages, as “[u]nsolicited faxes damage 
their recipients . . . [who] lose[] the use of [their] fax machine, 
paper, and ink toner.”  Docket 1.  PHI thus asserted that it was 
entitled to either its actual monetary losses or statutory 
damages, whichever was greater, because Defendants sent 
unsolicited faxes that failed to contain opt-out notices.   
Defendants filed summary judgment motions claiming the two 
faxes were not subject to the TCPA’s requirements because 
they were sent with prior express permission, meaning they 
were solicited and thus not prohibited by the TCPA, and also 
arguing that solicited faxes did not need to contain opt-out 
notices.3  The District Court granted both summary judgment 
motions.  See Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 
340 F. Supp. 3d 445, 453–54 (E.D. Pa. 2018).  PHI timely 
appealed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we 
apply the same standard as the district court to determine 
whether summary judgment was appropriate.  Jester v. Hutt, 
937 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2019).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
 
3 SciMedica adopted the arguments set forth by Cephalon.    
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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A factual dispute is genuine if 
the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A fact is material if it “might 
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Id.  
We view all “the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s 
favor.”  Stone v. Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141, 147 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2019).  
III. ANALYSIS 
This case presents no genuine dispute of material fact 
regarding whether the faxes sent were solicited—they were—
and whether solicited faxes needed to contain opt-out 
language—they do not.  As such, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   
A. The Two Faxes Were Solicited 
In this case, the issue of whether the two faxes were solicited 
or unsolicited boils down to whether the voluntary provision of 
a fax number, akin to the voluntary provision of a telephone 
number, constitutes express consent, invitation, and 
permission, and whether “express consent” and “express 
invitation or permission”—as found in the TCPA—are 
interchangeable.  Because we find that—and because PHI 
concedes to the fact that—there was a voluntary provision of a 
fax number to Defendants, and because we find that “express 
consent” and “express invitation or permission” are 
interchangeable, we conclude that the voluntary provision of a 
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fax number constitutes express consent, invitation, and 
permission, such that the two faxes in this case were solicited.4  
i. Voluntary Provision of a Number 
Under the TCPA, it is unlawful to send an unsolicited fax 
advertisement unless three conditions are met.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii); see also Mauthe v. Optum Inc., 925 
F.3d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2019).  Specifically, the statute prohibits 
“any person within the United States, or any person outside the 
United States if the recipient is within the United States . . . to 
use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other 
device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited 
advertisement[.]”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).  An “unsolicited 
advertisement,” is that which is sent “to any person without 
that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing 
or otherwise.”  Id.  § 227(a)(5) (emphasis added).  Thus, fax 
advertisements sent with the recipient’s prior express invitation 
or permission (i.e., solicited faxes) are not violative of the 
TCPA.  Id.   
The voluntary provision of a number—phone or fax—by a 
message-recipient to a message-sender, constitutes express 
consent such that a received message is solicited and thus not 
prohibited by the TCPA, if the message relates to the reason 
the number was provided.  See, e.g., Daubert v. NRA Grp., 
LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Fober v. 
Mgmt. & Tech. Consultants, LLC, 886 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 
2018) (concluding that the provision of a phone number and 
receipt of a call that relates to “the reason why the called party 
 
4 Our dissenting colleague views this case as evidencing only 
implied consent.  Hence, the crux of our disagreement.    
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provided his or her phone number in the first place” constitutes 
express consent such that the calls were deemed solicited); 
KHS Corp. v. Singer Fin. Corp., No. 16-55, 2018 WL 
4030699, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2018) (concluding the same, 
but in the context of fax advertisements, and collecting cases).   
In Daubert, a plaintiff alleged a violation of the TCPA due to 
the receipt of sixty-nine calls that he alleged were unsolicited.  
861 F.3d at 387.  The defendant argued that the district court 
was wrong in granting summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 
TCPA claim, contending instead that a jury could conclude the 
plaintiff had provided his “prior express consent” to receive 
calls regarding a medical bill.  Id. at 389.  This Court proceeded 
to analyze the TCPA’s scope “guided by the statute’s text, the 
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) 
interpretations of the statute, the statute’s purpose, and our 
understanding of the concept of consent as it exists in the 
common law.”  Id. at 389.  We first afforded express consent 
its ordinary meaning.  Id.  Then, we noted that:  “On the issue 
of prior express consent the FCC has found that ‘persons who 
knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given 
their invitation or permission to be called at the number which 
they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.’” Id. 
(quoting In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. 
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8769 (1992)) 
(emphasis added).   
We then summarized the FCC’s relevant ruling, namely, that 
the provision of a number to a party evidences prior express 
consent by the number-provider to be contacted at the number 
provided for purposes relating to why the number was 
provided.  Id. at 390.  And we noted that “[t]he FCC’s rulings 
make no distinction between directly providing one’s cell 
phone number to a creditor and taking steps to make that 
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number available through other methods, like consenting to 
disclose that number to other entities for certain purposes.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  Finally, we affirmed 
that “Congress did not intend to depart from the common law 
understanding of consent . . .  that it’s given voluntarily.”  Id. 
at 390 (citation and quotations marks omitted) (emphasis 
added).   
Though the facts of Daubert differ from the facts of this case 
it is instructive on the TCPA and when prior express consent 
exists.5  Id.  Prior express consent can be deduced from a 
message-recipient’s voluntary provision or “knowing[] 
release” of his or her number to a message-sender, such that a 
message is solicited and thus not prohibited by the TCPA if the 
message relates to the reason the number was provided.  Id. at 
389; see also Fober, 886 F.3d at 793; KHS Corp., 2018 WL 
4030699, at *4.  Indeed, the FCC’s own explanation supports 
this concept, explaining that “[e]xpress permission to receive a 
faxed ad requires that the consumer understand that by 
providing a fax number, he or she is agreeing to receive fax 
advertisements.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. A-S 
Medication Sols., LLC, No. 19-1452, 2020 WL 881329, at *3 
(7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (quoting In re Rules & Regulations 
Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (TCPA) of 1991, 17 
F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14129 (2003)) (emphasis added); see also 
 
5 In Daubert there was no direct evidence that the plaintiff had 
given his prior express consent to receive calls, as he had 
merely provided his cell number to a hospital, an intermediary 
associated with a creditor, when he was admitted.  Daubert, 
861 F.3d at 390. 
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Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Sys., LP, 931 F.3d 1094, 1101 
(11th Cir. 2019) (finding that hotel franchisees had provided 
their express permission and invitation to receive faxes 
because the franchisees understood that the Wyndham Hotel 
Group might provide optional assistance with facility items, 
which would inherently entail receiving information about 
products to purchase, and that by having included a fax number 
in an agreement, “the hotels invited the assistance or 
advertisements to come by fax.”).6  
Here, it is undisputed that PHI voluntarily provided a business 
card with a fax number on it to Defendants (i.e., knowingly 
released the number such that the provision was an invitation 
 
6 In this case, PHI understood that the voluntary provision of 
their business card, with a fax number on it, was in part for the 
purpose of having drug representatives contact them with 
information on the drugs.  See JA200 (answering affirmatively 
in a deposition that the business cards were provided for the 
drug representatives “to have, so they could get in touch” with 
the doctors).  We acknowledge that PHI believes A-S 
Medication supports their position in this matter, but the facts 
between that case and the present case are clearly 
distinguishable.  In A-S Medication, a company sent a fax 
advertisement to 11,422 different numbers from an “acquired 
customer list.”  2020 WL 881329, at *1.  That is drastically 
different from the present case wherein two faxes were sent to 
PHI after drug representatives had continued and sustained 
contact with Dr. Martinez and voluntarily provided fax 
numbers, in part, for the purpose of having drug representatives 
be in contact and provide follow-up information. 
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to be contacted), and it is undisputed that the two faxes related 
to prior conversations Cephalon’s drug representatives had 
with Dr. Martinez as part of an ongoing business relationship.7  
 
7 This conceded fact touches upon our dissenting colleague’s 
first concern: that there remains a genuine dispute of material 
fact regarding whether Dr. Martinez gave Cephalon prior 
express permission to send the faxes.  Again, the following is 
stressed: 1) case law and the FCC both acknowledge that the 
voluntary provision of a telephone number constitutes express 
permission to be contacted, and 2) PHI—the Plaintiff-
Appellant in this case—conceded that there was a voluntary 
provision of a fax number to Defendants.  As such, and as 
explained further below, we find that the voluntary provision 
of a fax number also constitutes express permission to be 
contacted, and here, there is literally no question, only a 
concession, that a fax number was voluntarily provided to 
Defendants, meaning there was express consent to be faxed.  
Though our dissenting colleague focuses on Dr. Martinez’s 
deposition, Dr. Martinez is neither a plaintiff nor appellant in 
this case.  His testimony is of course relevant, but Plaintiff-
Appellant PHI’s concession that there is no question of fact 
regarding the voluntary provision of the business card with a 
fax number on it is key.  Thus, there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact that need be resolved.  
Our dissenting colleague, here, too, believes we have applied 
the wrong legal standard, permitting implied permission to 
satisfy the TCPA’s requirement of express permission.  He 
suggests that PHI’s conduct of leaving business cards on the 
receptionist’s desk is passive and cannot constitute express 
consent.  He questions this opinion’s reliance on our prior 
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But PHI quarrels with the law believing that “express consent” 
and “express invitation and permission” are different and not 
interchangeable.  PHI argues that “express consent” relates 
only to telephone calls whereas “express invitation or 
 
precedent in Daubert and our references to Fober and KHS 
Corp.  
We stress that this case does not involve implied permission, 
but voluntary provision, which has been equated to express 
consent in the telephone context, and which here, we equate to 
express consent in the fax context.  
There is no question that Daubert centered on telephone calls 
and not faxes.  861 F.3d at 387.  But Daubert, in a similar vein 
to this case, addressed situations in which phone calls could be 
deemed solicited or unsolicited and then either permissible or 
impermissible in accordance with the TCPA.  Id. at 389.   
Our dissenting colleague is concerned that the FCC’s use of “in 
effect” shows that “releasing a contact number is merely 
implied consent through conduct” but the FCC itself was 
speaking to the issue of “prior express consent.”   
Further, consent in this case is buttressed by the fact that the 
fax number was provided in the first place, namely, so that PHI 
could be contacted.  See also Fober, 886 F.3d at 793 (“FCC 
orders and rulings show that . . . transactional context matters 
in determining . . . consumer’s consent . . . . To fall within the 
prior express consent exception, a call must relate to the reason 
why the called party provided his or her phone number” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
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permission” relates to faxes, that case law about the provision 
of numbers in telephone situations is inapposite, and that 
Defendants needed to prove more than the voluntary provision 
of the fax number to properly meet their burden for summary 
judgment purposes.  We disagree.   
ii. Express Consent and Express Invitation or 
Permission Are Interchangeable  
The plain language of the TCPA shows that “express consent” 
and “express invitation or permission” are interchangeable and 
applicable to both phone calls and faxes.  Our analysis of the 
TCPA “is guided by the statute’s text, the [FCC’s] 
interpretations of the statute, the statute’s purpose, and our 
understanding of the concept [in question].”  Daubert, 861 
F.3d at 389 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
The TCPA does not define either “express consent” or “express 
invitation or permission,” and when phrasing in a statute is 
undefined, we give it its ordinary meaning.  Id.  “The ordinary 
meaning of express consent is consent ‘clearly and 
unmistakably stated.’”  Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
346 (9th ed. 2011)).  Consent is “[a] voluntary yielding to what 
another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or 
permission regarding some act or purpose, esp. given 
voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.”  
CONSENT, Black’s Law Dictionary 368 (10th ed. 2014) 
(emphasis added).  Similarly, express permission is “clearly 
and unmistakably granted by actions or words, oral or written,” 
and permission is “the official act of allowing someone to do 
something.”  PERMISSION, Black’s Law Dictionary 1321-
1322 (10th ed. 2014).  Notably, the definition of “consent” 
contains “permission.”    
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Further, and as stated above, “[o]n the issue of prior express 
consent the FCC has found that ‘persons who knowingly 
release their phone numbers have in effect given their 
invitation or permission to be called at the number which they 
have given, absent instructions to the contrary.’”  Daubert, 861 
F.3d at 389 (quoting 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8769).  Likewise, the 
FCC has found that calls received after “prior express 
invitation or permission” are not “unsolicited calls.”  See In re 
Rules & Regulations, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8766 n.47 (defining 
“telephone solicitation” and using the “prior express invitation 
or permission” language as opposed to “express consent” 
language) (emphasis added).8  The TCPA prohibits telephone 
calls save in part for those made with “prior express consent.”  
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B).  It also separately defines 
“telephone solicitation” as the “initiation of a telephone call or 
message . . . but such term does not include a call or 
message (A) to any person with that person’s prior express 
invitation or permission . . . .”  Id. § 227(a)(4) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, both the TCPA and the FCC use the two 
phrases—“express consent” and “express invitation or 
permission”—interchangeably within the context of telephone 
calls.  And so, why then should the two phrases not be deemed 
interchangeable in the context of faxes?  Express consent and 
express invitation or permission are interchangeable.  Courts 
have recognized that the FCC deems the knowing release of a 
phone number in the telephone context can be deemed to 
 
8 The FCC has also noted that:  “Express permission to receive 
a faxed ad requires that the consumer understand that by 
providing a fax number, he or she is agreeing to receive faxed 
advertisements.”  In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the 
Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (TCPA) of 1991, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 
14014, 14129 (2003).   
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constitute express consent, invitation, or permission to receive 
calls.  Here, we extend that reasoning to the realm of faxes (i.e., 
that the knowing, voluntary release of a fax number, and the 
receipt of a fax related to why the number was provided, 
constitutes express consent such that the faxes would be 
deemed solicited).  
It is true that the TCPA prohibits faxes save those 
communicated with “express invitation or permission,” and 
does not say “express consent,” but both the language’s plain 
meaning and the FCC’s interpretation show that “express 
consent” is interchangeable with “express invitation or 
permission.”  Compare id. § 227(b)(1)(A)-(B), with id. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C), and id. § 227(a)(4)-(5).  And while the statute 
has different subsections under “Prohibitions” for telephone 
calls and faxes, the language used in each subsection—the 
primary issue here—and as defined elsewhere in the statute, is 
interchangeable as shown above.  Compare id. § 227(a)(4), 
with id. § 227(a)(5) (exemplifying that the statute itself uses 
“prior express invitation or permission” in both the telephone 
and fax sections).   
While PHI suggests that the District Court “applied the lower 
standard for ‘consent,’” arguing the standards for fax 
advertisements (those bound by “express invitation or 
permission”) are “more stringent” than those for phone calls, 
we must disagree.  See Appellant’s Br. 19–20.  “Express 
consent” and “express invitation and permission” are 
synonymous in the context of the TCPA, and accordingly the 
standards are not different.   
The District Court was thus correct in finding that there was 
undisputed evidence establishing that PHI provided business 
cards with its fax number to drug company representatives, 
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thereby giving express consent, invitation, and permission to 
receive related information, and thus in finding that the two 
faxes were solicited.  See Physicians Healthsource, 340 F. 
Supp. 3d at 452–54.9   
 
9 In addition to finding that “PH[I] provided business cards 
containing its fax number to drug company representatives to 
enable those representatives to fax information to Dr. 
Martinez,” the District Court also found that there was 
undisputed evidence that Dr. Martinez himself gave 
“representatives permission to send him additional information 
about the subject matters they discussed.”  Physicians 
Healthsource, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 453.  We note that PHI 
strongly opposes this latter finding.  We also note, as did the 
District Court, that deposition testimony and the general record 
indicate that Dr. Martinez agreed to receive follow-up 
information about the drugs discussed with the Defendants.  
But regardless, the voluntary provision of the fax number by 
PHI constituted express invitation and permission in and of 
itself.  Thus, absent a definitive expression to not be sent any 
information, which the record does not reflect, the fax number 
provided is sufficient to establish express invitation and 
permission.  We note here, that we are not, as our dissenting 
colleague suggests, flipping the burden that a party seeking to 
prove consent must carry the burden of proof—rather, we are 
finding that Defendants have met that burden.  
Further, as the TCPA indicates, and as the FCC has itself noted, 
the statute is not meant to curb communication in established 
business relationships.  Though the statute is silent with regard 
to solicited advertisements in the context of an established 
business relationship, it explicitly permits unsolicited fax 
advertisements so long as there is, in part, “an established 
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B. Solicited Faxes Do Not Need to Contain Opt-Out 
Language 
The TCPA is silent regarding solicited faxes.  See generally 47 
U.S.C. § 227.  And while it provides one exception to its 
prohibition on sending unsolicited faxes—which in part calls 
for the inclusion of opt-out notices—the exception is 
inapplicable here, as we have established the faxes in this case 
were solicited.  Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii).  Yet, PHI provides 
an alternative argument: should we find the faxes were 
solicited, solicited faxes still require an opt-out notice.  For this 
argument, PHI points not to the TCPA, but to a 2006 FCC rule 
 
business relationship” between the sender and the recipient.  47 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i).  The FCC has also noted “that 
facsimile transmission from persons or entities who have an 
established business relationship with the recipient can be 
deemed to be invited or permitted by the recipient.”  In re Rules 
& Regulations, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. at 8779 n.87.  Why these two 
faxes should be curbed, when there was an established practice 
of drug representatives meeting with, following up with, and 
providing more information and samples to Dr. Martinez and 
PHI, defies logic.   
Though our dissenting colleague believes this opinion finds 
that the established-business-relationship (“EBR”) exception 
of the TCPA saves Defendants, this opinion does no such 
thing.  The EBR exception is relevant when faxes are 
unsolicited.  Here, we found that the faxes were solicited, and 
so the EBR exception does not apply.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(2)(D) is thus not relevant to our analysis.  For 
thoroughness, we are only adding that there was indeed an 
established business relationship in this case.  
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(the “Solicited Fax Rule”) requiring opt-out notices on 
solicited fax advertisements.10  PHI argues the District Court 
was incorrect to assert that it was bound by a D.C. Circuit 
decision that found the Solicited Fax Rule was “unlawful to the 
extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes[.]”  See 
Physicians Healthsource, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 449 (quoting Bais 
Yaakov of Spring Valley v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 852 F.3d 
1078, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 1043 
(2018)); see also Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. 
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 
71 Fed. Reg. 25,967-01, 25,971-72 (May 3, 2006) (codified at 
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)).  But we agree with Bais 
Yaakov, and independently find that the FCC cannot require 
solicited fax advertisements to include opt-out notices, as the 
TCPA is silent regarding solicited faxes and opt-out notices.  
In Bais Yaakov, then-Judge Kavanaugh held “that the FCC’s 
2006 Solicited Fax Rule [was] . . . unlawful to the extent that 
it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes,” as the FCC had 
exceeded its authority under the TCPA, which dealt with 
“unsolicited fax advertisements.”  852 F.3d at 1079, 1083.   
The Bais Yaakov decision was the result of the United States 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s consolidation of 
multiple petitions by fax senders who were contesting the 
FCC’s Solicited Fax Rule.  See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC 
v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, Inc., 863 F.3d 460, 464 (6th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 1284 (2018) (providing a 
thorough review of the procedural history in Bais Yaakov).  
Although the FCC had argued that the TCPA’s “requirement 
that businesses include opt-out notices on unsolicited fax 
 
10 The FCC is permitted to “prescribe regulations to implement 
the requirements of [the TCPA].”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2).  
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advertisements grant[ed] [them] the authority to also require 
businesses to include opt-out notices on solicited fax 
advertisements,” the D.C. Circuit disagreed.  Bais Yaakov, 852 
F.3d at 1081 (emphasis in original).  The TCPA has explicit 
language regarding when opt-out notices are necessary for 
unsolicited faxes, but is silent regarding solicited faxes.  Id. at 
1081–82.  And the TCPA does not “grant the FCC authority to 
require opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements.”  Id. at 
1082 (emphasis added).   
The FCC’s 2006 Solicited Fax Rule was in opposition to the 
TCPA’s clear language, and the FCC did not have the ability 
to regulate solicited faxes:   
Congress drew a line in the text of the statute 
between unsolicited fax advertisements and 
solicited fax advertisements. Unsolicited fax 
advertisements must include an opt-out notice. 
But the Act does not require (or give the FCC 
authority to require) opt-out notices on solicited 
fax advertisements. It is the Judiciary’s job to 
respect the line drawn by Congress, not to redraw 
it as we might think best. . . . The FCC may only 
take action that Congress has authorized. 
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).  
There is no question that the plain language of the TCPA 
indicates that it relates to and regulates “unsolicited” messages.  
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4)-(5), (b)(1)(A)-(C).  And the 
purpose of the TCPA, in part, is to “curb[] the inundation of 
‘junk faxes’ that businesses . . . receiv[e].”  See Sandusky 
Wellness, 863 F.3d at 463 (quoting H.R. Rep. 102-317 at 10 
(1991)).  Its purpose is not to curb permitted, invited, and 
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consented to—i.e., solicited—faxes.  As such, under the 
TCPA, solicited faxes do not need to contain opt-out notices.11   
The District Court was thus correct in determining that the 
Solicited Fax Rule did not apply in this case, and that the two 
solicited faxes sent did not need to include opt-out language.     
 
11 Sister circuits have found the same, and we also note that 
certain circuit courts have found the Bais Yaakov decision was 
binding on other circuits.  See e.g., Sandusky Wellness, 863 
F.3d at 467 (citing Peck v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 535 F.3d 
1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also True Health 
Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 896 F.3d 923, 929–30 
(9th Cir. 2018) (finding the same); Physicians Healthsource, 
340 F. Supp. 3d at 450 (collecting district court cases that have 
held the same); cf. Brodsky v. HumanaDental Ins. Co., 910 
F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that the decision of the 
D.C. Circuit on the FCC regulation “is binding on all courts of 
appeals through the Hobbs Act” but finding the decision was 
“as applied” and “not an untimely attack on the 2006 Order.”).  
We do not need to decide whether the decision was binding on 
us or not though, as we reach the same conclusion of the Bais 
Yaakov decision—that the 2006 Solicited Fax Rule was 
unlawful—independently.    
Further, of note, the FCC has since eliminated the Solicited Fax 
Rule.  See Order, Petitions for Reconsideration and/or 
Declaratory Ruling and Retroactive Waiver of 47 C.F.R. § 
64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Regarding the Commission’s Opt-Out 
Notice Requirement for Faxes Sent with the Recipient’s Prior 
Express Permission, 33 F.C.C. Rcd. 11179, 11179 (Nov. 14, 
2018).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Defendants because there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact that the two fax advertisements were solicited, 
and solicited fax advertisements do not require opt-out 
language.    
 1 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority 
overlooks genuine disputes of material fact on the central issue 
of prior express permission, applies the wrong legal standard, 
and because the established-business-relationship exception to 
the Junk Fax Prevention Act’s express-consent requirement 
does not apply. 
I 
 There is a genuine dispute of material fact about 
whether Dr. Martinez or PHI gave Cephalon prior express 
permission to send the fax advertisements. The majority places 
significant weight on Dr. Martinez’s deposition testimony that 
PHI’s “business cards, with the fax number in question, were 
made available to drug representatives.” Maj. Op. 5–6. The use 
of passive voice in that sentence is telling: Like most physician 
practices, PHI simply leaves business cards in the reception 
area for patients and anyone else to pick up. JA 200. There is 
no evidence that PHI or Dr. Martinez specifically gave 
business cards to Cephalon’s drug representatives as an 
express grant of permission to send fax advertisements. Of 
course, there are many reasons why physicians make their 
business cards available to patients and others who enter the 
office. But it is not apparent on this record that PHI did so 
expressly to solicit fax advertisements from Cephalon. I think 
the majority too easily finds express permission from a fact that 
is ambiguous at best. See, e.g., Maj. Op. 11 (“Here, it is 
undisputed that PHI voluntarily provided a business card with 
a fax number on it to Defendants[.]”). 
During his deposition, Dr. Martinez was also queried 
whether Cephalon’s visiting representatives would 
“sometimes” ask if they could follow up and send him 
“things.”  JA 194. Dr. Martinez answered affirmatively—yes, 
the representatives sometimes asked that question. But the 
deposition examiner’s question was so indeterminate 
(“sometimes” asked?) and nondescript (what are “things”?) 
that it obscures rather than illuminates.  
The examiner chose not to ask Dr. Martinez the obvious 
follow-up question: Did the Cephalon representatives with 
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whom Dr. Martinez spoke ask if they could send him the fax 
advertisements at issue? In any event, Dr. Martinez later 
explained that he never “specifically requested” the two fax 
advertisements in dispute. JA at 217. So I cannot agree with 
the majority’s suggestion that this deposition snippet shows 
that Dr. Martinez agreed to receive follow-up information 
about the drugs discussed with Cephalon’s representatives. 
Maj. Op. 11 n.6; see also Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. A-S 
Medication Sols., LLC, — F.3d —, 2020 WL 881329, at *3 
(7th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (noting FCC regulations interpreting 
“express permission to receive a faxed ad requires that the 
consumer understand that by providing a fax number, he or she 
is agreeing to receive fax advertisements”).1 I especially cannot 
agree because we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of Dr. Martinez and PHI, the non-moving party. See Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“The 
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”) (citation omitted). 
The majority contends, however, that “PHI concedes 
that ‘at best, [Cephalon] marshalled enough evidence at 
summary judgment to show … [PHI’s] voluntary 
communication’ of its fax number to [Cephalon].” Maj. Op. 5 
(quoting Appellant’s Br. 24); see also Maj. Op. 12 n.7 
(“[T]here is literally no question, only a concession, that a fax 
number was voluntarily  provided to Defendants[.]”). Passively 
providing a fax number to the general public—even 
voluntarily—is not equivalent to express permission. And the 
majority also acknowledges that PHI “strongly opposes” the 
finding that Dr. Martinez gave Cephalon express permission to 
send him the faxed advertisements. See id. at 17 n.9. 
In any event, there is no concession. PHI’s brief merely 
allows that “at best” Cephalon showed “an established 
business relationship and the voluntary communication of its 
fax number.” Appellant’s Br. 24 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Although the summary-judgment 
 
1 The majority notes the difference between our case and A-S 
Medication by emphasizing the difference between the number 
of fax advertisements sent. See Maj. Op. 11 n.6. What these 
two cases have in common, however, is that neither party gave 
express permission to receive the fax advertisements. 
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standard prohibits us from viewing the evidence in Cephalon’s 
favor, the majority draws this inference against the non-
moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 
Nothing in the record shows that Dr. Martinez expressly 
permitted Cephalon to send him fax advertisements or even 
other, unidentified “things.” JA 194. Because a genuine dispute 
of material fact exists on this issue, I believe that summary 
judgment is inappropriate. 
II 
 Aside from the material factual disputes, the majority’s  
legal standard incorrectly allows implied permission to satisfy 
the TCPA’s requirement of express permission.  
I agree with the majority that the TCPA’s terms 
“express consent” and “express permission” have 
interchangeable meanings. See Maj. Op. 14. “The ordinary 
meaning of express consent is consent ‘clearly and 
unmistakably stated.’” Id. (quoting Express consent, Black’s 
Law Dictionary 346 (9th ed. 2011)). By contrast, the ordinary 
meaning of implied consent is “consent inferred from one’s 
conduct rather than one’s direct expression.” Implied consent, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added). 
Here, the majority concludes that PHI’s conduct—
passively leaving business cards on a receptionist’s desk—
expressly permitted Cephalon representatives to send fax 
advertisements to Dr. Martinez. See Maj. Op. 17 n.9 (“[T]he 
voluntary provision of the fax number by PHI constituted 
express invitation and permission in and of itself.”); id. at 16–
17 (“PHI provided business cards with its fax number to drug 
company representatives [by leaving them on a desk], thereby 
giving express consent, invitation, and permission to receive 
related information[.]”). But PHI did not “clearly and 
unmistakably” give its permission to receive fax 
advertisements by leaving business cards on a receptionist’s 
desk. Rather, the majority can only infer from PHI’s conduct 
that Dr. Martinez gave permission. The majority’s conclusion 
conflates the plain meanings of express and implied consent.  
 The majority’s reliance on our decision in Daubert v. 
NRA Group, LLC does not save its misinterpretation of the 
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TCPA’s unambiguous text. In Daubert, we noted that an FCC 
regulation on prior express consent provided that “persons who 
knowingly release their phone numbers have in effect given 
their invitation or permission to be called at the number which 
they have given, absent instructions to the contrary.” 861 F.3d 
382, 389 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Rules 
& Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 
1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 8769 (1992)). 
 The FCC regulation’s use of the phrase “in effect” 
shows that knowingly releasing a contact number is merely 
implied consent through conduct. One can give consent 
“expressly” or he can do so “in effect,” but those words are not 
synonymous. The regulation thus appears to violate the 
TCPA’s requirement of express consent.  
But in Daubert we recognized that the FCC adopted the 
regulation under its authority to exempt from the TCPA’s 
express-consent requirement certain calls to cell phones. 861 
F.3d at 389–90; see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C). Here, the 
FCC lacks statutory authority to exempt fax advertisements 
from the express-permission requirement. So Daubert’s 
reasoning—and the FCC’s regulation creating an exemption in 
the cell phone context—is not applicable.2 Neither our 
precedent nor the statute’s text provides any reason to ignore 
the plain meanings of express and implied consent. 
The majority implicitly places the burden on PHI and 
Dr. Martinez to opt out of unsolicited fax advertisements. See 
Maj. Op. 5 (“Dr. Martinez never told Cephalon or its 
representatives to stop sending [the fax advertisements].”); id. 
at 17 n.9 (“[A]bsent a definitive expression to not be sent any 
information … the fax number provided is sufficient to 
establish express invitation and permission.”). This conclusion 
 
2 Here, the majority opinion largely adopts the reasoning of the 
District Court, which relied on KHS Corp. v. Singer Financial 
Corp., No. 16-55, 2018 WL 4030699, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 
2018). KHS relied on Daubert. But the district court in KHS 
failed to recognize that the FCC’s statutory authorization to 
exempt calls from the express-consent requirement did not 
give it authority to exempt fax advertisements from the 
express-permission requirement. 
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flips the well-established burden that a party seeking to prove 
consent—and thus express permission—must carry the burden 
of proof. See Daubert, 861 F.3d at 390; True Health 
Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 896 F.3d 923, 931–32 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
III 
 Finally, the established-business-relationship (“EBR”) 
exception does not save Cephalon’s fax advertisements from 
violating the TCPA. The majority notes that the TCPA 
“explicitly permits unsolicited fax advertisements so long as 
there is, in part, ‘an established business relationship’ between 
the sender and the recipient.” Maj. Op. at 17 n.9. The majority 
then asserts, “Why these two faxes should be curbed, when 
there was an established practice of drug representatives 
meeting with, following up with, and providing more 
information and samples to Dr. Martinez and PHI, defies 
logic.” Id. at 18 n.9. 
 The reason why the two fax advertisements should be 
curbed is simple: They do not satisfy the TCPA’s requirements 
for unsolicited faxes under the EBR exception.3 The EBR 
exception applies only if three criteria are met. The third 
criterion is that “the unsolicited advertisement contains a 
notice” satisfying certain requirements. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(C)(iii). One requirement is that an unsolicited fax 
include an opt-out notice. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii)–
(vi).  
 Cephalon’s fax advertisements to Dr. Martinez did not 
contain any opt-out notice, let alone one in compliance with 47 
U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). That should dispense any discussion of 
the EBR exception. Although I may agree with the majority 
that the exclusion of these fax advertisements “defies logic,” 
we should not defy the requirements of a statute passed by 
Congress. 
 
3 Given the majority’s finding that PHI solicited the fax 
advertisements by putting its doctors’ business cards at the 
reception desk, its discussion of the established business 
relationship exception is puzzling.  
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*   *   * 
 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
